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Smith: Comparative Negligence in Wyoming

COMMENTS
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN WYOMING
The perennial debate in state legislatures across the
country between the "all or nothing" rule of contributory
negligence and a system of apportioning damages between
two negligent parties is being resolved by an increasing
number of states in favor of general comparative negligence
or apportionment legislation.' In the last five years alone,
nine states2 have enacted some type of apportionment statute,
owing largely, one may suspect, to the unwillingness of many
states to accept no-fault insurance legislation.' This brings
the total number of states that have accepted the doctrine
of comparative negligence to sixteen.4 With the passage of
H.B.94, Wyoming has become the seventeenth.'
Comparative negligence is not a new concept in American
tort law. The principle of dividing damages between two
negligent parties had its origin in this country in several nineteenth century admiralty decisions.' From there it was incorporated into the Federal Employers' Liability Act of

1908,' the Jones Act,' and the Death on the High Seas Act.'
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Henceforth, "apportionment" legislation will be used coterminously with
"comparative negligence" legislation, as used to describe the apportioning
of damages between two negligent parties. Prosser has pointed out that
the term "comparative negligence," when used to describe the dividing of
damages, is actually a misnomer, since comparative negligence properly
refers only to a comparison of fault of the plaintiff with that of the
defendant, and does not necessarily result in any division of damages.
Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465 (1953).
Since 1968, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont have adopted comparative
negligence legislation.
As Chief Justice Hallows of Wisconsin stated in a dissenting opinion in
Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513, 521 (1970),
"What I do fear is that if the doctrine of pure comparative negligence is
not adopted, the whole fault system in torts will be repudiated and a nofault system akin to workman's compensation adopted."
Other states include Arkansas, Georgia, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin.
Wyo. STAT. § 1-7.2(a) (Supp. 1973).
The Explorer, 20 F. 135 (E.D. La. 1884) ; Olsen v. Flavel, 34 F. 477 (D. Or.
1888); The Mystic, 44 F. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1890).
Apr. 22, 1908, ch. 149, § 3, 35 STAT. 66 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1970)).
Mar. 4, 1915, ch. 153, § 20, 38 STAT. 1185 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1970).
June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 33, 41 STAT. 1007 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 766

1970)).
Copyrght@ 1973 by the UntvWrty of Wyoming
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About a third of the states, including Wyoming," followed
with some type of state "employers' liability act," generally
restricted to railroad employees, and as early as 1910 the first
general comparative negligence statute was adopted in Mississippi.
All of the existing statutes on comparative negligence,
whether in admiralty law or at the state or federal level,
share two common features: (1) they are phrased to mitigate
the defense of contributory negligence by providing that, in
some degree, the negligence on the part of the person seeking
affirmative relief will not bar recovery; and (2) the plaintiff's recovery, if any, is diminished by the degree or percentage of contributory negligence attributable to him. But as
to the percentage of contributory negligence that will defeat
recovery by the plaintiff, the various apportionment statutes
differ. There are three separate views.
The first, adopted at the state level by Mississippi 1 and
recently Rhode Island," has been called "pure" comparative
negligence,"3 "pure" in that the plaintiff may recover some
portion of his damages notwithstanding the percentage of
his own contributory negligence, as long as the defendant is
also guilty of some degree of causal negligence. Recovery is
then reduced by the percentage of negligence attributable to
the plaintiff. Hence, under this type of statute, which has the
effect of abolishing the defense of contributory negligence,
a plaintiff who is theoretically 99 percent negligent can recover 1 percent of his damages from the defendant.
A second, and totally antiquated version of comparative
negligence, is the" slight-gross negligence" rule, adopted only
in Nebraska 4 and South Dakota. 5 By this version, the plaintiff cannot recover at all if his negligence is more than
''slight," or if the defendant's negligence is less than " gross.'"
Otherwise, he may recover damages diminished by his slight
negligence.
10.

WYO. STAT. § 37-225 (1957).

11. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1956).
12.
13.

R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1972).
Editorial Annotation, Co'mparative Negligence Cases, 18 DEFENSE L.J. 570,

594 (1969).
14.

NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151

(1964).

15. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967).
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The third variety of comparative negligence, known as
the "equal to or greater than" rule," has recently been adopted in Wyoming. Initiated by the state of Wisconsin in 1931,
its basic feature is the preclusion of recovery by a plaintiff whose negligence is "equal to or greater than" that of
the defendant. If plaintiff's negligence is less than that of
the defendant, he recovers a sum diminished by his own degree or percentage of negligence. This rule only modifies,
rather than abolishes, the defense of contributory negligence.
Variations exist in some states, 7 whereby the claimant may
recover if his negligence was not greater than the defendant's, or put differently, if his fault equals that of the def endant but does not exceed 50 percent of the total. The "equal
to or greater than" rule, with its variations, is definitely the
most popular type of apportionment statute. Endorsed by
the American Bar Association, 8 it has been adopted, exclusive of Wyoming, by twelve of the sixteen comparative negligence states.
I.

THE WYOMING ACT

A. Derivation
The major portion of the Wyoming Act" is identical with
the pre-1971 Wisconsin statute."0 In 1971 Wisconsin amended
its comparative negligence statute to allow a plaintiff to recover if he was equally at fault with the defendant 2 -prior to
16. Supra note 13, at 574.
17. New Hampshire, N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1971); Vermont,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1972); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.045 (Supp. 1973).
18. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON AUTOMOBILE
ACCJIDENT REPARATION 74-76 (1969).
19.
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any
person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such
negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to the person recovering.
Wyo. STAT. § 1-7.2(a) (Supp. 1973).
20. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1966).
21.
The new statute reads: "Contributory negligence shall not bar
recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to
recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury or
property, if such negligence was not * * * greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to the person recovering." (Statute's
emphasis)
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (Supp. 1973).
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the amendment he had to be less negligent to receive a favorable verdict. While moving the allowable range of recovery
up from "49 percent" to "50 percent" may seem like a token
gesture on the part of the Wisconsin legislature, it can actually
make a significant difference in a sizable group of cases, and
is becoming increasingly popular among the states that have
adopted or are considering the adoption of comparative negligence legislation.22
The effect of the amendment is to increase the number
of negligent plaintiffs who are entitled to recover under the
apportionment statute. In the 1970 Wisconsin legislative
Council hearings, which led to the passage of the amendment,
it was reported that, under the 49 percent statute, many Wisconsin defense attorneys were telling the unknowing jury
to find the parties equally negligent because it was "the democratic thing to do.""8 Particularly was this so where finding
the degree of plaintiff's negligence became a contest of
credibility and conflicting liability factors. Moreover, percentages are not easily calculated when comparing different
types of conduct, nor when the jury is subject to a barrage
of conflicting testimony and argument of counsel in summation. The result in many cases is likely to become a "split it
down the middle" attitude among a frustrated jury, especially
if it has become polarized in its deliberations and a compromise is mandatory if a verdict is to be reached.24 Although
the quantity of such verdicts in the trial courts of Wisconsin
has not been reported, apparently it was sufficient to compel
the Wisconsin legislature to amend a statute that in all other
respects had worked admirably since 1931.
It is not known whether the Wyoming legislature intentionally adopted the identical wording of the pre-1971 Wisconsin Act, or whether the rather obscure Wisconsin amendment2" simply was not discovered. As will be seen in the
pages to follow, however, the "49 percent" Wyoming Act
and the "50 percent" Wisconsin amendment will lead to dia22.
23.
24.
25.

Supra note 17.
Flynn, Comparative Negligence: The Debate, 8 TIAL 49, 50 (1972).
Id. at 51.
Compare notes 19 and 21. Only a careful reading discloses any difference.
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metrically opposite results in a suprisingly different number
of factual situations."6
Notwithstanding the substantive differences of the present statutes, pre-1971 Wisconsin case law nonetheless becomes
an invaluable source from which to seek interpretative answers to problems that will inevitably arise in the operation
of the Wyoming Act.27 Indeed, in Wyoming, if an identical
statute is adopted which has already received a known and
definite construction in the courts of the state from which
the statute was taken, it is presumed that Wyoming's courts
will adopt the construction thus given.2 8 The case authority
of Wisconsin, therefore, as well as that of other applicable
jurisdictions,2 9 will be emphasized in this paper in attempting to anticipate and solve some of the problems most likely
to be encountered by the Wyoming practitioner in his experience with the new apportionment statute. Be it noted here,
however, that the interpretive problems of the new statute
have by no means all been solved for the Wyoming courts by
those of Wisconsin. Though Wisconsin has had over four
decades of experience with its apportionment statute, resulting in an abundance of case law on a wide range of problems,
Wisconsin tort concepts are significantly different from those
in Wyoming.3" At least in certain areas, then, the Wyoming
courts will be plowing new ground as the problems arise.
B. Scope
The most obvious limitation on the comparative negligence doctrine is that it contemplates a finding of negligence
on the part of both parties to the action. It has no application where no negligence on the part of the defendant, or no
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, is shown.
Generally speaking, a comparative negligence statute may
be invoked by a defendant in any case in which, except for
26. See text infra, p. 603.
27. To the extent that post-1971 Wisconsin decisions do not revolve around
the "49-50 percent" distinction, they will continue to represent sound precedent for Wyoming courts.
28. Mitchell v. Walters, 55 Wyo. 317, 100 P.2d 102, 103 (1940).
29. Other states with the "equal to or greater than" rule, such as Arkansas,
Maine, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, Idaho and Colorado
may all be looked to as sources of interpretation. In most of these states,
however, the statutes have not been in force long enough to build up any
appreciable body of case law.
g0. See text infra, p. 618.
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the adoption of the statute, the defense of common law contributory negligence would be available." Thus, it has been
held that the apportionment statutes apply in an action arising out of the negligence of a carrier causing injury to a passenger, " where the defendant's negligence is based on the
law of attractive nuisance and the plaintiff child is guilty of
contributory negligence," in an action arising out of the negligent maintenance of a nuisance, or of a nuisance growing out
of negligence,3 4 and in an action arising out of negligent misrepresentation."
But where contributory negligence is not an issue or defense, the apportionment statutes will not operate. In an
action based on an intentional wrong, for example, policy
reasons demand that any contributory negligence of the plaintiff be overlooked. 6 Since the law considers only the wrongdoer to be at fault under these circumstances, there is no occasion to compare the fault of both parties. The same considerations generally apply to an action based on wilful and
wanton conduct of the defendant. 7
Where the defendant is subject to the imposition of strict
liability for harm inflicted on another while the defendant
was engaged in an ultrahazardous activity, or for an injury
caused by a dangerous instrumentality or agency in the defendant's possession or under his control,3" the contributory
negligence of the person injured is not a defense unless the
plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably subjected himself to
the risk of harm presented by such instrumentality, agency,
or activity. Thus, where the doctrine of strict liability is
recognized and the conduct of the plaintiff does not fall within this exception, the apportionment statute cannot be invoked. In Wyoming it is doubtful if strict liability in the
classic Fletcher v. Rylands sense even exists.4"
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

57 AM. JUR. 2d Negligence § 438 (1971).
Roberts v. Yellow Cab Co., 240 A.2d 733 (Me. 1968).
Nechodomu v. Lindstrom, 273 Wis. 313, 77 N.W.2d 707 (1956).
Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 76 N.W.2d 355 (1956).
Seagroves v. ABCO Mfg. Co., 118 Ga. App. 414, 164 S.E.2d 242 (1969).
PROSSER, TORTS § 65, at 426 (4th ed. 1971).
See text infra, p. 624.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 484(2) (1971).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 484(2) (1971).
Jacoby v. Town of Gillette, 62 Wyo. 487, 174 P.2d 505 (1946). Prosser
states that the RyIlands v. Fletcher doctrine is "probably" rejected in
Wyoming. PROSSER, TORTS § 78, at 509 (4th ed. 1971).
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Neither has the doctrine of products liability found a permanent place in Wyoming law, probably because the appropriate case has not yet reached the appellate level.4 1 Where
products liability is recognized, whether contributory negligence operates as a complete defense depends to some extent
on whether the action is based on negligence, warranty, or
strict liability.42 Normally only when the action is based on
negligence will contributory negligence be recognized as an
absolute bar. In this connection, however, it is interesting to
note a recent Wisconsin case,4" where the court adopted the
rule of strict liability in tort for products liability cases, but
held that contributory negligence was nonetheless available
to the seller as a defense, but only to mitigate his liability. The
causal contributory negligence of the buyer was then compared to the unreasonable danger of the seller's product, and
the verdict entered accordingly.
II.

OPEMATION OF THE WYOMING ACT

A. Single Defendant v. Single Plaintiff
Reduced to its simplest form, the new apportionment
statute prevents recovery by a plaintiff whose negligence was
equal to or greater than that of the defendant. If a damaged
or injured defendant counterclaims against the plaintiff, the
party least negligent may recover damages reduced in proportion to his negligence. 4 The possibilities in a two-party
action will be illustrated by three exaimples.4"
Illustration 1.
Action -P sues D; D counterclaims against P
Damages-10,000 to P; $1,000 to D
P-51% negligent
D-49% negligent
Result -P recovers nothing; by way of counterclaim
D recovers 51% of his damages, or $510.
The case of Parker v. Heasler Plumbing & Heating Co., 388 P.2d 516 (Wyo.
1964) did hold that a manufacturer or seller of machinery owes a duty to
those who use it to make it free from latent defects and concealed dangers.
42. PROssER, TORTS § 102, at 670 (4th ed. 1971).
43. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
44. Paluezak v. Jones, 209 Wis. 640, 245 N.W. 655 (1932).
45. The idea received for these illustrations was taken from an excellent article,
Laugesen, Colorado Comparative Negligence, 48 DEN. L.J. 469 (1972).
41.
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Illustration 2.
Action -P sues D; D counterclaims against P
Damages--10,000 to P; $1,000 to D
P-49% negligent
D-51% negligent
Result -P recovers 51% of his damages or $5,100;
D recovers nothing.
Illustration 3.
Action -P sues D; D counterclaims against P
Damages--10,000 to P; $1,000 to D
P-50% negligent
D-50% negligent
Result -Both parties suffer their own loss.
Several authorities claim that the "equal to or greater
than" feature of the Wisconsin model is only a halfway measure, containing many of the vices inherent under the rule of
contributory negligence itself.4" They point to the situation
illustrated above where a theoretical 1 percent of negligence
can mean the difference between recovering nothing or recovering 51 percent of the damages claimed. Thus, if plaintiff alleges $10,000 in damages, he recovers $5,100 of that
sum if he is found 49 percent negligent and absolutely nothing
if he is found 50 percent negligent. Moreover, if the def endant counterclaims, and plaintiff is found 51 percent negligent, not only must he bear his entire loss of $10,000, but he
must pay 51 percent of the defendant's damages as well. Although juries have rarely made such exact findings of negligence,47 this serves only as an aggravated example of the
46. Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative Negligence, 1941 Wis. L. REV. 289
(1941); Flynn, Comparative Negligence: The Debate, 8 TRIAL 49 (1972);
Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953); Fuchsberg,
Comparing Comparative Negligence, 1970 Proceedings, ABA INCL. SEC. 522.
There is nothing just in requiring a defendant to pay 51 percent of
the plaintiff's damages when the plaintiff is 49 percent at fault
and allowing the defendant to go scot free when he is 49 percent at
fault and the plaintiff is 51 percent at fault. What is so magic
about being less than, greater than, or equally negligent, that justice may depend on it.
Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120. 177 N.W.2d 513, 520 (1970).
47. Most findings of negligence under the special verdict forms are found in
percentages ending in "5" or "0". But note the findings of negligence in a
Wisconsin case, Schleif v. Korass, 260 Wis. 391, 51 N.W.2d 1 (1952).
15.42%
Plaintiff
14.17%
Defendant 1
Defendant 2
47.08%
23.33%
Defendant 3
Also, there are several reported cases where the jury has apportioned 51%
of the fault to defendant and 49% to the plaintiff, obviously a result of
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same problem when a jury apportions 60 percent of the fault
to defendant and 40 percent to plaintiff. Generally, these
critics favor a "pure" comparative negligence statute, that
allows the plaintiff a recovery despite his percentage of contributory negligence.
On the other hand, it is often claimed in support of the
Wisconsin model that no one should be allowed to recover
when it has been shown that his greater negligence caused the
harm that occurred. 8 It has also been pointed out that comparative negligence was only meant to be a "compromise
amelioration of strict contributory negligence, which denied
recovery to a plaintiff who was even 1 percent negligent."4 9
Finally, in response to some critics, it is said that the "equal
to or greater than" rule gives all potential litigants notice of
the burden of proof they must overcome, and that if a "pure"
type of comparative negligence were adopted, any accident
where damage was suffered would result in a lawsuit, because of the chance of a recovery against a defendant regardless of his percentage of negligence or of plaintiff's contributory negligence."0
The controversy thus centers not around the desirability
of adopting some variation of comparative negligence, but
rather the form such legislation is to take and the degree of
contributory negligence necessary to defeat recovery by the
plaintiff.
wanting the plaintiff to recover, but not being able to differentiate who was
responsible for the greater negligence.
48. To this ,the answer is sometimes given that, "where a certain percentage
of contributory negligence deprives a claimant of any recovery whatever,
it is equally unseemly that a defendant has escaped scot-free after nevertheless inflicting substantial damage." Flynn, Comparative Negligence:
The Debate, 8 TRIAL 49, 51 (1972).
49. Laugeson, Colorado Comparative Negligence, 48 DEN. L.J. 469, 474 (1972).
50. Ghiandi, 10 For the Defense, #8 (Oct. 1969), 61, 64. A good indication of
the increase in litigation, if any, resulting from the enactment of a "pure"
form of comparative negligence is its effect on liability insurance rates.
Arkansas, which prior to 1957 had a pure form of comparative negligence,
has been the subject of recent study in this regard. It was found by one
writer that once the all-or-nothing rule was eliminated in Arkansas, liability
rates suffered no demonstrable rise, and the increased number of recoveries
were seemingly balanced out by a reduction in the size in verdicts. It was
also found that there was no significant increase in court congestion, owing
to the larger number of cases being settled out of court. Note, Comparative
Negligence-A Survey of the Arkansas Experience, 22 ARK. L. Rav. 692
(1969).
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B. Multiple Defendants
Some of the most difficult problems, and most glaring
weaknesses, of the "equal to or greater than" rule arise in
multiple defendant cases. Three recognizable problems have
reached the appellate level.
1. Joint and Several Liability
The adoption of comparative negligence does nothing to
alter the common law rule of joint and several liability." As
to all defendants that are more negligent than the plaintiff,
the plaintiff can proceed to judgment against all as a unit,
against each separately, or against only one if he so desires.
As the example below shows, this can make one defendant
responsible for the fault of another, more negligent defendant.
Illustration 4.
Action -Suit by P against D1 and D2
Damages-$10,000 to P
P- 5% negligent
D1-10% negligent
D2-857%negligent
Result -D1 and D2 are jointly and severally liable
for $9,500 to P.
In this example P can hold D solely liable for $9,500 in
damages, even though he was responsible for only 10 percent
of the fault. But it is the common law rule of joint and several
liability, and not the apportionment statute, that produces
this seemingly unjust result. Assuming that P was not negligent, the same result would occur in a jurisdiction that has
retained the rule of contributory negligence as a complete
defense in an action for negligence.
In construing its apportionment statute, the Wisconsin
courts have made it clear that each responsible defendant is
jointly and severally liable for the full sum recoverable by the
plaintiff.2 A more just result, however, and one often suggested,53 would occur if the negligence of any party who is not
joined (D2 in the above example) were eliminated from con51. Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
52. Id.
53. Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative Negligence, 1941 Wis. L. REV. 289
(1941).
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sideration, resulting in a comparison of plaintiff's negligence
only with those defendants he has chosen to hold responsible.
Thus, in the above example, only D1's negligence would be
compared with that of P; D1 would then be liable for $5,000
to P, as opposed to the $9,500 he would owe under the rule of
joint and several liability.
2. Contributions among Joint-tortfeasors
If the first defendant (D1) in the illustration above
were in a jurisdiction that allowed contribution among joint
tortfeasors, he could compel his co-defendant to pay half the
damages. 4 Alternatively, if the plaintiff elected to proceed
against D2,the first defendant would have to account for onehalf of the judgment, even though he was only 10 percent
negligent.
A significant minority of jurisdictions do not recognize
the right to contribution."5 In these states the courts will
not help the wrong-doers to distribute their loss among themselves. If the parties are in pari delicto, the law leaves them
as it finds them.
Neither rule is well suited for a jurisdiction that has
adopted comparative negligence legislation. Under the rule of
contribution, a party who is primarily responsible for the
harm can compel a nominally negligent party to pay half the
damages, while under the no-contribution rule, the defendant
whom the plaintiff chooses to proceed against must bear the
entire loss, irrespective of his relative percentage of negligence. Both rules offend the basic concept of comparative
negligence, that each party shall bear the burden of the loss
proportionate to his percentage of fault.
The recognition of the injustice of equal contribution
under the apportionment statutes has led Wisconsin to develop a unique approach to this perplexing problem. In
Bielski v. Schulze 6 called "one of the greatest decisions in
Wisconsin jurisprudence,'"'" the court was confronted with
54.
55.
56.
57.

PROSSER, TORTS § 50 (4th ed. 1971).
Id.
16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
Heft & Heft, Comparative Negligence: Wisconsin's Answer, 55 ABA J.
127, 130 (1969).
58. Supra note 56, at 107.
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the following situation: Defendant made a left turn across
a highway, directly in front of plaintiff's oncoming car, and
a collision resulted. The jury found the defendant 95 percent
causally negligent and plaintiff 5 percent negligent. After a
jury award of $25,000, the defendant and his insurer irpleaded the insurer for plaintiff and cross-claimed for contribution of $12,500, or one-half of the award, to which they
were entitled to under the then existing law of contribution
between joint tort-feasors in Wisconsin. Abandoning the pro
rata method of contribution as inconsistent with the concept
of comparative negligence, the court awarded the defendant's
insurer $1,250, or 5 percent of the judgment against it, rather
than the $12,500 it had demanded. The court made it clear,
however, that the plaintiff can still recover from any tortfeasor guilty of greater negligence." The rule announced
in Bielski applies only to the contribution rights of multiple
defendants. In other words, the rules of joint and several
liability have not been altered by this decision, only the manner in which the defendants are to share the burden of the
loss once judgment has been pronounced.
With the passage of ll.B. 162 in the last session of the
legislature, Wyoming has joined a majority of states in adopting the right to contribution among joint tortfeasors, and has
accomplished by statute what Wisconsin has achieved through
the courts. In accepting the right to contribution, the legislature has wisely provided that where there is such a disproportionate degree of fault among the joint tortfeasors as to
render an equal distribution of fault among the inequitable,
the relative degrees of their fault are to be considered in
making the final apportionment." This concept of "com59. WYO. STAT. § 1-7.4(c) (Supp. 1973). The relevant parts of the statute are
set forth below:
1-7.4 Contribution among joint tortfeasors
(a) The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors, but a
joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution
until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has
paid more than his pro rata share thereof.
(b) A joint tortgeasor who enters into a settlement with the injured
person is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint
tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished
by the settlement.
(c) When there is such a disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors
as to render inequitable an equal distribution among them of the
common liability by contribution, the relative degrees of fault
of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their
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parative contribution" is a logical extension of comparative
negligence legislation and avoids the result under the common
law right to contribution where a nominally negligent defendant can be forced to pay a disproportionate amount of
damages.
3. Individual Comparison of Each Defendant's Fault
When multiple defendants are joined, it is well settled
in Wisconsin" that the plaintiff's negligence is to be compared with the negligent conduct of each defendant, and
recovery is then allowed as against any defendant whose negligence exceeds that of plaintiff's. Only Arkansas" adheres
to the opposite rule, where the negligence of the defendants is
combined and considered as a unit in making the comparison
of negligence with the plaintiff. The significance of the two
different rules can be seen in the following example.
Illustration 5.
Action -Suit by P against D1, D2, and D3
Damages-$10,000 to P
P-21% negligent
D1-20% negligent
D2-20% negligent
D3-19% negligent
Result -all defendants dismissed.
Under the Wisconsin rule, the plaintiff recovers nothing
because his negligence exceeds that of each of the defendants.
But under the Arkansas position, the plaintiff can recover
$7,900; the combined negligence of the three defendants exceeds his own.
Opponents of the Wisconsin rule62 point to two decisions
handed down by the Wisconsin courts as demonstrative evipro rata shares solely for the purpose of determining their rights
of contribution among themselves, each remaining severally liable
to the injured person for the whole injury as at common law.
1-7.5; Same; certain matters not affected
(a) Nothing in this act affects
(i) The common law liability of the several joint tortfeasors to
have judgments recovered and payment made from them individaully by the injured person for the whole injury. However,
the recovery of a judgment by the injured person against one
joint tortfeasor does not discharge the other joint tortfeasors.
(ii) Any right of indemnity under existing law.
60. Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934);
Schwenn v. Loraine Hotel Co., 14 Wis. 2d 601, 111 N.W.2d 495 (1961);
61. Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 346 S.W.2d 20 (1962).
62. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1953); Flynn, Com-

parative Negligence; The Debate, 8 TAL

49 (1972).
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dence of the unsoundness of that rule. In the first, 3 the fault
of the plaintiff was found to be 50 percent, and that of each of
two defendants 25 percent. The plaintiff was denied all
recovery, while each defendant recovered 75 percent of his
damages by way of counterclaim. In Arkansas, neither party
would recover under these facts. In a second case,6" the plaintiff and both defendants were all found equally negligent.
Because the plaintiff's negligence was equal to that of the two
defendants, his claim was dismissed, even though collectively
the defendants were 67 percent negligent. Under the Arkansas rule the plaintiff would have recovered two-thirds of his
damages.6
These rather harsh results have compelled several authorities6 to advocate forcefully the Arkansas rule, which obviously is more favorable to plaintiffs as a class. But one does
not have to search far to find an example that vividly shows
the weakness of the Arkansas position.
Illustration 6.
Action -Suit by P against D1 and D2
Damages-10,000 to P
P-497%negligent
D1-46% negligent
D2- 5% negligent
Result -P can recover $5,100 from either D1 or D2.
Where the negligence of the defendants is combined, and
it exceeds the negligence of the plaintiff, any defendant so
joined is jointly and severally liable for the damages under
the Arkansas rule, regardless of his percentage of negligence.
Thus, D2, who is only incidentally negligent, is potentially
liable for $5,100. Although he may find partial relief in a
state where an equal right to contribution exists, he remains
liable for a considerable sum of money, whereas under the
Wisconsin rule neither D2 nor D1 would be liable. The problem becomes particularly acute where it turns out that D1 is
judgment proof, immune, or simply cannot be found (or P
63. Kirchen v. Tisler 255 Wis. 208, 38 N.W.2d 514 (1949).
64. Becker v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 456, 99 N.W.2d 804 (1959).
65. Note that under the new Wisconsin "50%" rule, supra note 21, one of these
unsatisfactory results would be avoided. If the plaintiff's negligence is
equal to that of the defendant's, he is not barred from recovery.
66. See, e.g., Flynn, Comparative Negligence: The Debate, 8 TRIAL 49, 52
(1972).
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does not want to join him in this suit)." For then P has no
choice but to proceed against D2 to judgment if he is to recover anything; D2's right to contribution then becomes
worthless.
There is no perfect solution to this problem, short of
adopting a "pure" form of comparative negligence, where
the problem simply does not exist. But the potential for
abuse seems greatest with the Arkansas rule, for to some
extent the plaintiff can manipulate the substantive outcome
of the case through procedural joinder and he can compel full
recovery from a defendant who is far less negligent than he.
The inequities of the Wisconsin rule, though very real, seem
to occur less frequently.
C. Wrongful Death Actions
Under Wyoming's Wrongful Death Statute,"8 any defense, including contributory negligence, which might have
been set up against the decedent had he lived, is still available
to the defendant,6 9 even though the statute is said to create
a separate and independent cause of action for the benefit
of the designated survivors.7 The adoption of comparative
negligence does nothing to change this basic rule. Thus, not
only must the negligence of the plaintiff-beneficiary, if any,
be individually compared with that of the defendant under
the apportionment statute,7 1 but so also must any negligence
of the decedent.7" Plaintiff's recovery is diminished by the
extent of the decedent's negligence in the same manner as it
67. In Wisconsin, the special verdict form requires an accounting of all causal
negligence for the purposes of comparing the fault of the parties, even if
a defendant cannot be properly joined, resulting in the following situation:
Action -Suit by P against Dl and D2; D3 is not joined
Damages-$10,000 to P
P-10o negligent
Dl- 9% negligent
D2-11% negligent
D3-70% negligent
Result
-D1 dismissed; P recovers $9,000 from D2.
68. WYO.STAT. § 1-1065 (1957).
69. Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901 (Wyo. 1963). The Wyoming Wrongful Death
Statute is but a version of the original Lord Campbell's Act, which contained an express provision limiting the death action to those cases where
the deceased might have recovered damages if he had lived. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 127, at 910 (4th ed. 1971).
70. PROSSER, TORTS § 127, at 910 (4th ed. 1971).
71. Truesdill v. Roach, 11 Wis. 2d 492, 105 N.W.2d 871 (1960).
72. Johnson v. Roberson, 88 Ga. App. 548, 77 S.E.2d 232 (1953).
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would if he was himself negligent, and barred altogether if
decedent's negligence exceeds that of the defendant.
Whether the negligence of both the decedent and the
plaintiff-beneficiary, where both are negligent, is to be combined or compared separately with that of the defendant has
been answered squarely by a recent Wisconsin case. In Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Dairyland Mutu4l Insurance
Co.7 it was held that a widow's negligence would have to be
combined with that of the decedent in comparing her negligence with that of the defendant. The following illustration
makes this point clear.
Illustration 7.
Action -Suit by P as personal representative of
the deceased against DI and D2
Damages-$l0,000 to P
P- 5% negligent
Decedent-15% negligent
D1-10% negligent
D2-70% negligent
Result -P cannot recover from D1 because the combined negligence of P and the decedent exceeds that of D1. P recovers $9,500 from D2.
Where multiple plaintiffs are suing in a wrongful death
action, or any action based on negligence, the damages are
apportioned as to the negligence of each individual plaintiff.
In Hansberry v. Dunn," for example, where a husband and
wife both sued the defendant for the wrongful death of their
daughter, but which was caused partially by the wife's negligence, the court held that the husband was entitled to a full
one-half of the verdict, while the wife's one-half of the verdict must be diminished by the percentage of her negligence
which contributed to the child's death.
D. Making the Apportionment
1. Basis for Making the Comparison of Fault

The courts have generally found it preferable to refrain
from stating any exact rules in the area of comparisons of
negligence and subsequent apportionment. No rule of thumb
73. 273 Wis. 349, 77 N.W.2d 599 (1956).
74. 230 Wis. 626, 284 N.W. 556 (1939).
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can be set forth with respect to the apportionment of negligence between the parties."6 But while the comparison of negligence is primarily a question for the jury in this regard, the
Wisconsin courts, at least, have made it clear that there are
instances where the court may hold as a matter of law that
plaintiff's negligence was equal to or greater than that of
the defendant, although this is rarely done."6 Generally, it
must be apparent from the evidence accepted by the jury
as controlling that the negligence of plaintiff and that of the
defendant were so like each other in kind and character or
so nearly equivalent as to be comparable as a matter of law
before the judgment for plaintiff will be disturbed." If the
finding of the jury is supported by any credible evidence
under any reasonable view, the court will generally sustain
.it. Especially is this so, according to one case," where the
negligence of each party is not of the same kind and character,
such as where a drunken driver hits a pedestrian jaywalking
across the street while reading a newspaper. But even if a
party is found guilty of negligence as a matter of law, this
does not necessarily compel a verdict for the other party. One
may be found negligent as a matter of law and still be substantially less negligent than the other party."
It is clear that the number of respects in which a particular party is found negligent does not control the jury's comparison of negligence and apportionment of damages. In
Van Wie v. Hull" the court held that the jury could find that
plaintiff was more negligent than the defendant, even though
it also found defendant guilty of negligence in two respects
and the plaintiff guilty in only one. The conduct of the parties
as a whole should control the comparison of negligence, regardless of the number of acts or omissions that have been submitted to the jury.8
It is also evident from Wisconsin case law that the kind
or category of the respective parties' negligence alone does
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Kohler v. Dumke, 13 Wis. 2d 211, 108 N.W.2d 581 (1961).
Hustad v. Evetts, 230 Wis. 292, 282 N.W. 595 (1938).
Webster v. Roth, 246 Wis. 535, 18 N.W.2d 1 (1945).
Pruss v. Strube, 37 Wis. 2d 539, 155 N.W.2d 650 (1968).
De Goey v. Herman, 233 Wis. 69, 288 N.W. 770 (1939).
15 Wis. 2d 98, 112 N.W.2d 168 (1961).
Taylor v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 270 Wis. 408, 71 N.W.2d 363

(1955).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1973

17

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 8 [1973], Iss. 2, Art. 9

614

LAND AND WATR LAW REVIEW

Vol. VIII

not govern the comparison. In Enjen v. Pack City Transit
Lines Inc.,82 the court found that merely because the negligence of the plaintiff and defendant was of the same character
(because both were driving on the wrong side of the road),
this alone did not require a finding that the negligence of the
respective parties was equal as a matter of law. The quality
of negligence does not determine quantity. Although the
plaintiff and defendant may be guilty of negligence in the
same factual respect, the jury may find plaintiff's negligence
less than defendant's.8
It has been suggested that, while the facts of each peculiar case must ultimately govern the comparison of fault
between the parties, yet there are certain types of repetitive
negligent conduct that may be reduced to average percentages
of fault between plaintiff and defendant. Suggested comparisons of negligence between drivers in ordinary cases, for
example, have been made as follows :84

Type of Accident
Rear end
Intersection
Uncontrolled
Stop sign
Signal light
Left turn
Oncoming
Failure to yield
Improper passing
Wrong side of road
Improper turn

Defendant

Plaintiff

100%
60%
85%
90%

401%
15%
10%

80%
70%
75%
90%
80%

20%
30%
25%
10%
20%

Although under Wisconsin law it would probably be error
to allow such percentages before the jury, 5 they nonetheless
could serve a useful function in helping the court rule as a
matter of law on the negligence of the parties. They may
also be used in non-jury trials.
82. 9 Wis. 2d 153, 100 N.W.2d 580 (1960).
83. Fronczek v. Sink, 235 Wis. 398, 291 N.W. 850 (1940).
84. Heft & Heft, Comparative Negligence: Wisconsin's Answer, 55 ABA J.
127, 128 (1969).
85. The danger of the jury giving such evidence undue emphasis probably outweighs any probative value the evidence may have.
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2. The Special Verdict
The Wyoming legislature has provided for the use of the
special verdict in cases where the fault of the parties is to be
apportioned. 6 The major features of this provision are: (1)
it shall be used when requested by either party or when, in
the sound discretion of the .trial court, its use is deemed desirable; (2) the jury (or the court in a non-jury trial) is to
make special findings of fact in determining (a) the percentage of negligence attributable to each party and (b) the
amount of damages suffered by each; (3) the court, and not
the jury, reduces the amount of such damages in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
With the use of the special verdict, then, the jury is not
asked to return a general award for the plaintiff with an
assessment of recoverable damages, but rather it is asked a
series of specific questions, an example of which follows."
1. In operating his automobile at the time of and immediately preceding the collision was the defendant Jones
negligent with respect to the speed of the car?
2. If you answer Question I "yes" then answer this:
Was the defendant Jone's negligence a cause of the
collision?
3. In operating his automobile at the time of and immediately preceding the collision, was the plaintiff Smith
negligent with respect to failure to stop before entering the intersection?
4. If you answer Question 3 "yes" then answer this:
Was the plaintiff Smith's negligence a cause of the
collision ?
5. If you have answered all of Question 1, 2, 3, and 4
"yes" then answer this: What percentage of the total
negligence was attributable to the defendant Jones?
To the plaintiff Smith?
6. What is the amount of the damages plaintiff Smith
has sustained? Defendant Jones?
86. Wyo. STAT. § 1-7.2(b) (Supp. 1973).
87. Taken from Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REV. 1, 28 (1953).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1973

19

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 8 [1973], Iss. 2, Art. 9

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VIII

With this information, the court does the mathematics,
and proceeds to enter final judgment accordingly. This procedure is intended to eliminate a prejudice or desire on the
part of the jury to see one party or the other win or lose, and
as such constitutes a very effective device for controlling the
unreliable or irresponsible jury.8 It is thought that the special verdict, used in this manner, forces the jury to focus its
attention on every major aspect of the case, to weigh the evidence and follow instructions more carefully, and to make its
findings of fact without regard to how they will affect the
ultimate verdict. 9 The special verdict thus purports to impose a degree of dispassion and disinterest on the jury by
divorcing two of its traditional functions: making findings
of fact, and making conclusions based on those findings. With
the special verdict the latter function, that of making conclusions, is now a task of the trial court, and the jury ostensibly is ignorant of the final verdict until actually announced
by the court. As such, anything put before the jury that
informs it of the effect of its factual findings, such as reading
the apportionment statute to the jurors, has been held reversible error."0
The procedure of vesting with the trial court the duty
of reducing the total amount of damages by the negligence of
the party entitled to the verdict has been questioned on two
different grounds. First, it is said that it weakens the overall,
common judgment of the jury as well as its ability to smooth
over the "rough edges of the law." 1 Secondly, it is said to
have a great potential for jury confusion."2 In fact, the unfavorable experience with this feature of the special verdict
has led the Maine legislature to amend its apportionment
statute so that the responsibility of entering the final verdict
88. See Id. at 32: "A jury which on general principles would return a large
verdict in favor of a pretty woman and against a railroad company may well
hesitate to return special findings which it knows to be against the evidence."
89. Sunderland, Verdicts General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920).
90. De Groot v. Van Akkeren, 225 Wis. 105, 273 N.W. 725 (1937).
91.

5 MooR,

FEDERAL PRACTICE § 49.05, at 2236 (2d ed. 1972).

92. "I suggest that most juries believe when they find a plaintiff and a defendant each 50 percent negligent that the plaintiff will get one half of his
damages; but under the Wisconsin rule he will recover nothing." Vincent
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513, 520 (1970).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol8/iss2/9

20

Smith: Comparative Negligence in Wyoming

1973

COMMENTS

617

lies not with the trial judge, but with the jury." In Maine
the jury is to reduce the total damages to the extent deemed
just and equitable, with the knowledge that the lesser figure
is the final verdict in the case. Similar legislation has been
enacted in New Hampshire94 and Vermont. 5
While keeping the jury in ignorance of the effect of its
special findings of fact on the ultimate verdict is of dubious
value," there are other advantages of the special verdict that
warrant its use in negligence cases tried in a comparative
negligence jurisdiction. There is no way in which it can be
known, for example, that the jury found that the plaintiff
had been damaged $10,000, that the plaintiff himself was
guilty of 25 percent of the negligence, and that the jury
awarded him $7,500 for this reason. Without the special
verdict, the appellate court would have a difficult time in
dealing with pleas of excessiveness or inadequacy of the
judgment. 7
More importantly, perhaps, is the fact that the special
verdict enables the parties, the court, and the public to see
what the jury has actually done. This can eliminate the
necessity of re-trying an entire case. If the defendant raises
several defenses, for example, and the court erroneously in93. M.

94.
95.
96.

97.

REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1972).
Problems arose in implementing the Maine statute. The first was
that some judges construed it as requiring or permitting the submission of special questions to the jury as to negligent percentages, reserving to themselves the function of dollar damages reduction. Others did not, leaving to the jury the functions both of
finding the amount of negligence chargeable to the respective parties and reducing or disallowing the plaintiff's damages accordingly by general verdict. The judge-deduction procedure sometimes
resulted in a phenomenon described by Maine lawyers as the double
deduction. Juries, in attempting to answer special questions on
verdict forms, would sometimes, consciously or unconsciously, reduce the dollar amount of what was supposed to be the plaintiff's
recovery without respect to his proportionate causal negligence
themselves. Thereafter, the presiding judge, applying the negligence percentage found by the jury to the dollar amount written
on the verdict blank, would reduce it again.
NrxON, N.H.B.J. 27 (Fall, 1969).
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1972).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,,§ 1036 (Supp. 1972).
It is doubtful there is such clear demarcation of duty between judge and
jury as is often thought with the special verdict. A small arithmetic computation, that of multiplying the percentage of defendant's negligence
times the total damages suffered by the plaintiff, would reveal the same
information to the jury that the Wisconsin courts have strived to keep
from it. It cannot seriously be contended that the jury makes its special
findings of fact totally ignorant of their ultimate impact on the monetary
award, if any, made to the plaintiff.
Lipscomb, Comparative Negligence, 344 INs. L.J. 667. 674 (1951).
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structs the jury on one of these defenses in a manner detrimental to the plaintiff, after which the jury returns a verdict
for the defendant, then on appeal the court would be required
to reverse the judgment without a special verdict, because it
has no way of telling whether or not the verdict was based
solely on the tainted defense. But if, on the other hand, the
jury had been required to render a verdict on each one of the
defenses, the court would know at once the grounds of the jury
decision and whether or not the error in the instruction was
harmless.9
Finally, because of its obvious tendency to favor the defendant, the special verdict is claimed to have kept the size
of the verdict down in the great increase of recoverable cases
brought under the new apportionment statute, thus keeping
liability rates within reasonable bounds. 9
III.

THE AFFECT OF THE WYOMING ACT

ON RELATED AREAS OF TORT LAW

A. Last Clear Chance
The jurisdictions are sharply divided on the effect of
comparative negligence legislation on the doctrine of last
clear chance. Nebraska' 0 and South Dakota... have retained
the last clear chance rule by judicial decree. Georgia has evidently preserved the doctrine by statute as applicable to the
plaintiff and has judicially extended the rule to defendants."°2
Maine,' on the other hand, has expressly abolished last clear
chance as inherently inconsistent with that state's apportionment statute. Arkansas0 . and Mississippi 0 5 have apparently
done so, while in Wisconsin last clear chance has never been
98.

COUND, FRIEDENTHAL & MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS

723-24 (1968).
99. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REv. 1, 33 (1953).
100. Hickman v. Parks Construction Co.. 162 Neb. 461, 76 N.W.2d 403 (1956).
101. Vlach v. Wyman, 78 S.D. 504, 104 N.W.2d 817 (1960); Haase v. Willers
Truck Service, Inc., 72 S.D. 353, 34 N.W.2d 313 (1948).
102. See Comment, The Validity of Retaining the Last Clear Chance Doctrine
in a State Having a Comparative Negligence Statute, 1 GA. ST. B.J. 500
(1965).
103. Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846 (Me. 1968).
104. See Price, Applicability of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine in Mississippi,
29 Miss. L.J. 247 (1958).
105. See Rosenburg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and
After" Survey, 13 ARK. L. REV. 89 (1959). See also Reppeto v. Raymond,
172 F. Supp. 786 (1959).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol8/iss2/9

22

Smith: Comparative Negligence in Wyoming

1973

COMMENTS

recognized, ' either before or after the adoption of comparative negligence in that state.
With the exception of Georgia, the retention of last clear
chance in the face of comparative negligence legislation has
apparently never occurred at all to the various state legislatures. The absence of legislative action has resulted in the
problem being cast upon the courts, whose response, as seen
above, reflects anything but unanimity. Prosser has urged
legislative action: "At least, in any future statutes, there
should be specific provision one way or another as to last
clear chance, and it should not be allowed, as in the past, to
go by default.""'
From the cases that have considered the matter, it is
clear that whether last clear chance is to survive in a comparative negligence jurisdiction is made to depend on which of
two explanations of the rule is accepted. The fixst, and most
often stated, is that if the defendant has the last clear chance
to avoid the harm, the plaintiff's negligence becomes antecedent, and is not a proximate cause of the harm. Since negligence that is not a proximate cause of the harm is not considered negligence at all, only one party, the defendant, is
considered to be at fault. Inasmuch as the fault of the two
parties is never apportioned unless the fault of each proximately caused the harm, there is said, according to this rationale, to be no conflict between last clear chance and the
apportionment statutes.0 8
Many authorities, however, have criticized this explanation as being quite out of line with modern ideas of proximate
cause, and insist that the real reason behind the last clear
chance rule is an intense dislike for the defense of contribuwith the result that some courts accept
tory negligence,'
106. Switzer v. Detroit Inv. Co., 188 Wis. 330, 206 N.W. 407 (1925).
107. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. Rrv. 1, 27 (1953). In a proposed draft, Prosser has specifically eliminated the doctrine of last clear
chance: "In all actions hereafter accruing for negligence resulting in
personal injury or wrongful death or injury to property, including those
in which the defendant has had the last clear chance to avoid the injury,
the contributory negligence of the person injured . . . shall not bar a
recovery.... " Id. at 37.
108. For a collection of cases see Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1261 (1958).
109. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1953): "Most of
the courts have talked of proximate cause, which makes no sense at all. ...
The real explanation would appear to be nothing more than a dislike for
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without reasoning the conclusion that the last wrongdoer is
necessarily the one that should be held accountable for the
injury caused. Considered in this light, "[a] ny necessity for
the last clear chance as a palliation of the hardships of contributory negligence obviously disappears when the loss can
be apportioned .... ""' If the rule is retained, on the other
hand, the person found guilty of ultimate negligence is required to bear the entire burden of the resulting damages,
and the last clear chance-comparative negligence combination becomes as harsh to the defendants as the traditional
contributory negligence rule was to plaintiffs. Both are allor-nothing rules; to prevent a shifting of the burden traditionally carried by plaintiffs under the harsh rule of contributory negligence to defendants under the doctrine of last clear
chance, both should be abrogated in a comparative negligence
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the result is that the system of comparative negligence breaks down in a sizable group of cases,
where the injury caused by the fault of two parties is still
entirely imposed upon one. The recognition of this anamolous
circumstance has led Maine to abolish a once viable last clear
chance doctrine after that state passed an apportionment
statute. After rejecting the proximate cause rationale of last
clear chance, the court in Cushman v. Porkins concluded:
[T]he last clear chance rule is but a modification of
the doctrine of contributory negligence. In our view
when our contributory negligence rule as an absolute
bar disappeared . . . through legislative action, the
last clear chance rule disappeared with it and no
longer exists as an absolute rule."1 '
Whether this reasoning would prevail in Wyoming is
not clear. The case law in this state on the doctrine of last
the defense of contributory negligence." See Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARv. L. REv. 233, 257-58 (1908): see also James, Last Clear
Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704, 707-08 (1938). "Certainly, if a man's negligence has put himself or his property in a position
of peril, that negligence is a proximate cause of the injury which follows
when the perils of the position become realized. In such case the likelihood
of the danger that befell was one of the very things that made his original
act negligent, and probable consequences are proximate ones". For the best
judicial rejection of the proximate cause rationale, see Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846, 849 (Me. 1968) "The theory that because the defendant
had the last opportunity to avoid the harm his negligence must have been
the sole proximate cause is hardly consistent with the modern concept that
several acts of negligence may combine to cause proximately an accident."
110. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REv. 1, 27 (1953).
111. 245 A.2d 846, 850 (Me, 1968).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol8/iss2/9

24

Smith: Comparative Negligence in Wyoming

1973

COMMENTS

621

clear chance generally adheres to the traditional proximate
cause explanation." In Borzea v. Anselmi, the court said:
"'[The doctrine of last clear chance characterizes]
. the negligence of the defendant, if it intervenes
between the negligence of the plaintiff or deceased,
and the accident, as the sole proximate cause of the
injury, and the plaintiff's antecedent negligence
merely as a condition or remote cause. The antecedent negligence of the plaintiff or deceased having
been thus relegated to the position of a condition or
remote cause of the accident it cannot be regarded as
contributory, since it is well established that negligence, in order to be contributory, must be one of the
proximate causes.' ....
On the other hand, the theory that last clear chance was
adopted to counter the harsh results of contributory negligence was recently argued before the Wyoming Supreme
Court,"" and there is language in Borzea v. Anselmi that supports this view.15 But regardless of the semantics employed,
the rule adopted by the Maine court, for the reasons stated
above, clearly represents the better view, and in absence of
legislation, the one that should be followed by the Wyoming
courts should the issue arise.
B. Assumption of Risk
Still unanswered is the impact the apportionment statutes should have on the common law defense of assumption
of risk. It has been said that the retention of assumption of
risk defeats the basic intention of comparative negligence
legislation because it continues to be an absolute bar in a
very common type of negligent conduct." 6 As Prosser maintains, "[i]t can scarcely be supposed in reason that the legislature has intended to allow a partial recovery to the plaintiff who has been so negligent as not to discover his peril at
112. Johnston v. Vukelic, 67 Wyo. 1, 213 P.2d 925 (1950); Lane v. Gorman, 347
F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1965).
113. 71 Wyo. 348, 258 P.2d 796, 803 (1952).
114. Flaim v. Berti, 503 P.2d 863, 865 (Wyo. 1972).
115. "'The last clear chance doctrine is not an exception to the general doctrine of
contributory negligence ... but operates merely to relieve the negligence of
a plaintiff or deceased in a particular instance, which would otherwise
be regarded as contributory, from its character as such.'" 71 Wyo. 348,
258 P.2d 796, 802 (1952).
116. PROSSER, TORTS § 68, at 457 (4th ed. 1971).
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all, and deny it to one who has at least exercised proper care
in that respect, but has made a mistake of judgment in proceeding to encounter the danger after it is known." 1 7
Again, with the exception of Oregon, 1 1 the various state
legislatures have failed to make provision for the effect of
comparative negligence on the doctrine of assumption of
risk. The courts of Mississippi, 1 ' Georgia,"' South Dakota, 12 and Arkansas,'2 2 have held that assumption of risk still
thrives despite the enactment of apportionment legislation.
Nebraska 23 and Wisconsin,'2 4 however, have decided that assumption of risk is no longer a complete bar to recovery when
the fault of both parties is to be apportioned, and that conduct which previously constituted assumption of risk is now
simply a type of contributory negligence to be considered
by the jury in measuring and comparing the relative fault
of the parties.
Wyoming apparently recognizes no distinction between
contributory negligence and assumption of risk, although there
appears to be some contradiction in the cases that have so
held." 5 The best statement of the court's refusal to acknow117. Id.
118. Oregon has abolished assumption of risk statutorily by providing that
"[c]ontributory negligence, including assumption of risk, shall not bar
recovery in an action . . . for negligence. . . ."

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

ORt.

REV. STAT. § 18.470

(1971). For a discussion of the statute, see Comment, Comparative Negligence in Oregon: A New Era in Tort Law, 8 WILAMET'TE L.J. 37 (1972).
Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947).
Roberts v. King, 102 Ga. App. 518, 116 S.E.2d 885 (1960).
Vee Bar Airport v. De Vries, 73 S.D. 356, 43 N.W.2d 369 (1950).
Bugh v. Webb, 231 Ark. 27, 328 S.W.2d 379 (1959).
Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943).
McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d
14 (1962).
The Taylor opinion, infra note 126, was upheld by a federal district court
in Askin v. Dalgarno, 293 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1961). But in a 1963 opinion,
the Supreme Court of Wyoming seemed to re-create the doctrine of assumption of risk. Citing no Wyoming case law, the court held in Cross v.
Foster, 378 P.2d 903, 904 (Wyo. 1963): "[A] reasonable evaluation of all
that plaintiff recalled shows he voluntarily assumed the risk and hazard
of riding in the automobile with full knowledge and appreciation of the
danger of so doing." Four months later, with no reference at all to
Cross, the same court remarked in another case, "Distinctions between
assumption of risk and contributory negligence have not been adopted in
Wyoming." Ford Motor Co. v. Arguelo. 382 P.2d 886, 891 (Wyo. 1963).
These seemingly inconsistent decisions can be reconciled by concluding that
the terms assumption of risk and contributory negligence are used interchangeably by the court, and that conduct which the court labels as assumption of risk is nothing but a species of contributory negligence. If so,
then both defenses are simply two different methods of describing the
same type of negligent conduct.
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ledge assumption of risk as a separate doctrine appears in
Rocky Mountain Trucking Co. v. Taylor, where it was said:
[T]he defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence are so closely allied that courts have
experienced considerable difficuty in attempting to
draw a maintainable line of distinction between them.
... We do not propose or deem it necessary to add
our own concept of what distinguishes the one from
the other nor do we specifically adopt as our own any
one of the distinctions announced by other courts. 2 '
Inasmuch as there is no difference in kind between the two
defenses, one disappears with the other as a complete bar to
recovery under the new apportionment statute.
There are no Wyoming decisions recognizing express or
contractual assumption of risk; yet it seems fair to conclude
that only implied or voluntary assumption of risk, and not
its express counterpart, is affected by comparative negligence
legislation. Comparative negligence contemplates only the
elimination of negligent conduct on the part of the plaintiff
as a bar to his recovery. It says nothing about a consensual
limitation of the duty normally owed to the plaintiff by the
defendant.
C. Guest Statute
Under Wyoming's Guest Statute, "No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his
guest without payment for such transportation shall have a
cause of action.. . unless such accident shall have been caused
by the gross negligence or willful and wanton mis-conduct of
the owner or operator of such motor vehicle. . . . " (Emphasis
added) 12 Whether the adoption of comparative negligence
affects the ability of the plaintiff to recover under the Guest
Statute depends on whether the statute contemplates two different kinds of culpable conduct, or only one, and whether
contributory negligence is a defense to such conduct.
The Wyoming Guest Statute was taken verbatim from a
Michigan statute." 8 According to the Michigan courts, 2 '
126. 79 Wyo. 461, 335 P.2d 448, 451 (1959).
127. Wyo. STAT. § 31-233 (1957). A proposal to repeal the Guest Statute was
defeated in the last session of the state legislature.
128. Mitchell v. Walters, 55 Wyo. 317, 100 P.2d 102, 104 (1940).
129. Pawlicki v. Faulkenson, 285 Mich. 141, 280 N.W. 141 (1938).
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along with a number of other jurisdictions with similar statutes, 8 ' gross negligence as used in this context is synonymous
with wilful and wanton conduct. Here there is only on type
of conduct contemplated by the statute, that of wilful conduct,
to which contributory negligence is not generally recognized
as a defense.' 3 ' According to this view the apportionment
statutes would have no application. In other jurisdictions,'3 2
gross negligence is merely a species or degree of negligence
that differs in kind from wilful and wanton conduct. Here
there are two separate types of conduct that may bar recovery
under a guest statute such as that in effect in Wyoming.
When the action is based on gross negligence, as a mere degree
of negligence, and to which contributory negligence is a complete defense, 3' the apportionment statute would then be
invoked and the fault of both parties divided.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has refused to follow the
lead of Michigan and has held that gross negligence and wilful
and wanton conduct are two different concepts."' Gross
negligence, according to one decision, may consist of a "series
of acts of ordinary negligence."' 3 It is "something less than
willful, wanton, and reckless conduct,' 3 6 differing from
"ordinary" negligence in "degree of inattention and in kind
from willful and intentional conduct which is or should be
known to have tendency to injure..'37
From these findings the following conclusions can safely
be made. Prior to the adoption of comparative negligence in
this state, an injured guest who attempted to recover under the
130. Posey v. Krogh, 65 N.D. 490, 259 N.W. 757 (1934); Brown v. Roach, 67 So.
2d 201 (Fla. 1953); Keehn v. Braubach, 307 Ill. App. 339, 30 N.E.2d 156,
164 (1940).
131. PROSSER, TORTS § 65, at 426 (4th ed. 1971).
132. Alspaugh v. Diggs, 195 Va. 1, 77 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1953); Shaw v. Moore,
104 Vt. 529, 162 A. 373, 374 (1932); Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588,
121 N.E. 505, 506 (1919) ; Thorsness v. Woltmann, 198 Minn. 270, 269 N.W.
637 (1936).
133. Supra note 131.
134. Mitchell v. Walters, 55 Wyo. 317, 100 P.2d 102, 108 (1940). The court felt
that if only one type of conduct had been contemplated by the legislature,
it would have described only one type of conduct: "The obvious query
suggests itself that as the terms 'gross negligence' and 'wilful and wanton
misconduct' both appear in the statute in the disjunctive-why the legislative body should have used both phrases if the first was intended to
mean the same as the last." Id.
135. Krahn v. LaMeres, 483 P.2d 522, 525 (Wyo. 1971), affirmed in Brown v.
Riner, 500 P.2d 524, 528 (Wyo. 1972).
136. Supra note 128, at 107.
137. Id.
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Guest Statute could be defeated in one of two ways: (1) he
could fail to carry his burden of proof, that is to say, he may
not be able to prove that his host was grossly negligent or
guilty of wilful and wanton conduct; (2) the host, if grossly
negligent, could prove him contributorily negligent. In either
event, the guest recovered nothing. With the adoption of the
new apportionment statute this second impediment is now
removed, and contributory negligence is no longer an absolute bar when defendant is proven grossly negligent. But the
apportionment statute does not operate at all if the host is
guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct, and it does nothing to
alter the plaintiff's burden of proof. The fault of the two
parties cannot be apportioned unless the plaintiff first proves
his host guilty of gross negligence.
D. Res Ipsa Loquiter
The doctrine of res ipsa loquiter, according to a recent
Wyoming case,138 is limited to situations where a thing which
causes injury, without fault of the injured person, is shown
to be under the exclusive control of the defendant, and the
injury is such as, in the ordinary course of things, does not
occur if the one having such control uses proper care. According to this pronouncement of the rule, if the plaintiff is
found to be contributorily negligent, he cannot avail himself
of res ipsa loquiter. In Wisconsin, however, where a similar
statement of res ipsa loquiter prevails, the court has held that
freedom from contributory negligence is no longer a requirement for the application of the rule under comparative negligence principles, and that if the defendant is found negligent, plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, goes to the
question of the comparison of negligence as between the plaintiff and defendant." 9 The doctrine will be barred only if the
percentage of plaintiff's negligence is as great or greater than
that of the defendant. Hence, as a result of the new apportionment statute, the elements of res ipsa loquiter in Wyoming
are reduced to two: (1) the injury must be such as in the
138. Hall v. Cody Gas Co., 477 P.2d 585 (Wyo. 1970).
139. Turk v. H.C. Prange Co., 18 Wis. 2d 547, 119 N.W.2d 365, 372: "However,
in view of Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute . . . it is more logical
to hold that in Wisconsin contributory negligence on the part of [the
plaintiff] should not be an absolute bar to her reliance on res ipoa loquiter."
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ordinary course of things would not occur in the absence of
negligence; and
instrumentality
The deletion of
from fault, has
tators.14

(2) the cause of the accident was an agency or
within the exclusive control of the defendant.
this third requirement, that plaintiff be free
found general support among the commen-

E. Pleading and Burden of Proof
In Wyoming the defendant must plead contributory negligence as an affirmative defense"'-the burden of proof for
such defense is on the one who asserts it. If not pleaded it is
waived,'4 2 unless the plaintiff fails to object to proffered
evidence,' 4 8 or the issue is tried by the express consent of the
parties.'
The new apportionment statute has no effect on
these rules of pleading. Since comparative negligence is but
a statutory refinement of the affirmative defense of contributory negligence, plaintiff need not plead freedom from
nor a lesser degree of negligence than defendant to state a
claim. The rule remains that a claiming party need not anticipate a defense in his pleading. However, since the apportionment statute operates either to reduce the damages awarded
to the plaintiff, or to preclude his recovery entirely if he is
more negligent than the defendant, the defendant should
plead in his answer either the preclusion or reduction of
damages feature of comparative negligence in his answer."'
Neither will the burden of proof vary under the apportionment statute. Wisconsin has held defendant's burden of
proof to be that which will convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt by a fair preponderance of the evidence that
plaintiff was negligent, and that such negligence was equal to
or greater than the defendant's. 4 The plaintiff must still
show the amount of damages, but the defendant must show
that the plaintiff's action should be defeated or his damages
diminished on account of plaintiff's negligence.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Ghiandi, 39 MARQUETTE L. REv. 361, 374 (1955-56).
WYO. R. CIv. P. 8(c).
WYO. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (2).
Porter v. Wilson, 357 P.2d 309 (Wyo. 1960).
Wyo. R. Civ. P. 15(b).
Laugesen, Colorado Comparative Negligence, 48 DEN. L.J. 469, 487 (1972).
Gauthier v. Carbonneau, 226 Wis. 527, 277 N.W. 135 (1938).
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The commendable efforts of the Wyoming legislature in
its recent adoption of comparative negligence legislation will
have a substantial impact on Wyoming tort law. The determination of liability no longer hinges on whether the plaintiff
is free from all fault. Rather, liability is established by determining who is guilty of the greater negligence. If one of two
negligent parties attempts to recover his losses, a comparison
of their negligence is made, and if the plaintiff's negligence is
not equal to or greater than the defendant's, a recovery is
allowed, reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's negligence.
The jury makes the comparison, by means of the special verdict, if requested, but does not know the result of its findings.
The court does the mathematics and renders judgment for the
reduced amount.
Since the statute prescribes only the mechanics of the
rule, questions arising from its actual operation in Wyoming
must necessarily await judicial resolution as they arise. Statutory silence on problems concerning multiple defendants,
for example, and the affect of the statute on related doctrines
of tort law, will be of particular concern to the practitioner
who must now try a negligence case in a new legal environment. Although acceptance of the doctrine of comparative
negligence is certainly a welcome change from the old common
law rule of contributory negligence, the transition may prove
to be an uncomfortable one until such time as answers are
provided to these and other questions by the courts, and preferably the legislature. Hopefully, resort to the experience
of other comparative negligence jurisdictions, combined with
an intuitive feel for workable results, will expedite the spirit
and purpose of Wyoming's new apportionment statute.
LENN E. SMITH
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